NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 6 | Number 1

Article 13

12-1-1927

Book Reviews
North Carolina Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
North Carolina Law Review, Book Reviews, 6 N.C. L. Rev. 117 (1927).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol6/iss1/13

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.

OPEN COURT
The judicial system ought not to be subject to such hazards. It
ought to stand on its own merits without regard to political faction.
With the prestige of the Superior Court bench threatened by
competing interests, there comes the tendency to abolish rotation as
a means of adding to the prestige, if possible. That would mean the
Superior Courts would become local courts. No longer would there
be a state system of courts. It would mean nothing less than an
abdication of a principle, as thoroughly written into the life of the
state as the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court is an appellate
court. It touches the life of the people only indirectly.
To abolish rotation would mean putting the state in reverse on its
court system at the very time it is succeeding so well with its state
system of schools and state system of highways. It would be going
in reverse with the one institution that has done more than anything
else to make possible the magnificent system of roads and the establishment of a state system of schools. 15
JoHN A. LINGsToNE.
Raleigh, N. C.
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The Law of Esidence, by Legal Research Committee of Commonwealth Fund. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1927. Pp.
xxii, 98.
The authors include among their number eminent jurists and
scholars, including Professor Wigmore. The purpose of the book
is to demonstrate and emphasize the necessity of five specific reforms
in the trial of lawsuits. The experiences and opinions of practicing
lawyers and trial jurists (largely embodied in answers to questionnaires) furnish the data upon which the committee bases many of its
conclusions. The method is perhaps unique and the result interesting. The reviewer must, however, confess to an impression that in
some instances the data is somewhat colored and the reasoning somewhat strained in an effort to support preconceived opinions of the
committee.

After discarding as impractical any effort toward either radical
or comprehensive changes in the rules of evidence, the committee
"The above article was prepared for the NORTH CAROLINA LAw RErVmw by
Mr. Livingstone, following substantially an article which appeared in the
Raleigh News and Observer on August 14, 1927.
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selects rather at random "the most fertile subjects for practical investigation." The first recommendation is that the trial judge be given
power to disregard the rules of evidence in the establishment of facts
about which there is no bona fide dispute, even though these facts
are at issue under the pleadings. Obviously, objection will be raised
to the additional discretion and authority given to the judge; but
there is convincing strength in the argument of the text that the
proposed change would eliminate some of the "gaming" elements of
a lawsuit in favor of justice for the litigants.
The second recommendation is that the trial judge be permitted
to comment on the weight and credibility of evidence. Some of
the arguments advanced by the committee seem unreal and find little
support in the answers to the questionnaire; but soundness of reason
and even a slight preponderance of practical opinion (as shown by
the questionnaire) support the view that this change would aid in
the ascertainment of truth. The presentation is impressive.
The third and fourth suggestions are closely related. By the
former an interested person would not be disqualified from testifying
as to a communication or transaction with a deceased or insane person; and by the latter all declarations of deceased and insane persons
would be competent if the court found them to be made in good
faith before the suit. In discussing the third change the authors
brand the present statutory disqualification as an illogical "remnant
of the common law disqualification of all interested witnesses"; and
they find practical support for the suggested change in the opinion
of experienced attorneys practicing in Connecticut, where the disqualification has been removed. The fourth recommendation, of
course, involves a wide exception to the hearsay rule. It has been
tried by only one state, Massachusetts; but the questionnaire discloses that on the whole the attorneys of that state consider the
experiment helpful in the ascertainment of truth.
The last recommendation is for a less exacting and more practical method of proving commercial transactions, that is, by admitting in evidence any entry made in the regular course of business.
This simple rule, the authors say, would cut through a mass of hybrid
rules, now confusing if not actually conflicting, and would meet the
needs of complex modern business.
In the final pages of the short volume the committee voices with
admirable candor "the disheartening truth" that the outlook for these
reforms are not bright. Of course, this thought has occurred to the
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practicing attorney and has remained with him as
text. But the apparent impossibility of immediate
prevent the pioneer work of the committee from
while contribution to the progress of the profession
of truth and justice.

he has read the
results does not
being a worthtoward an ideal
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Goldsboro, N. C.
The Law of Radio Communication, by Stephen Davis.
Hill Book Co., Inc., New York, 1927. Pp. ix, 206.

McGraw-

This small volume is certain to arouse a fair amount of interest
even before the reader opens it, for two reasons: It is the first book
to be published covering a new and increasingly important subject,
and it was awarded the Linthicum Foundation Prize by the faculty
of law of Northwestern University for the "best essay or monograph" submitted on the Law of Radio Communication. It is neither
a complete nor a detailed analysis of the problems in the field of
radio communication, and the author frankly states that fact. Quite
obviously Judge Davis chose to present in monograph form the various problems in the field, rather than to furnish a complete solution.
Few cases involving radio were decided under the Act of 1912.
None have arisen under the recent Act of 1927. As the law is
decidedly in the speculative stage, the volume is prefaced with the
significant statement that, when Lord Chancellor Francis Bacon
found it impossible to write a history of what was known, he "wrote
one of what it was necessary to learn."
After a brief resume of the conditions obtaining in the field of
communication by radio, including radio telephony, point-to-point
radio telegraphy, and general broadcasting, Judge Davis discusses
the "Right to Engage in Radio Communication." He submits that
every person has a "natural right" to build and operate a radio
transmitter; that the exercise of this "right" may be the subject of
governmental regulation; and that such regulation does not find its
source in governmental ownership of the ether as the medium through
which the transmitted force passes, but is based on the power of
the government to regulate the commerce utilizing that, as well as
any more common, medium. Nor is the regulation the only limitation upon the exercise of this natural right. The sic utere tuo
maxim must also be applied. Under "Federal Jurisdiction" the
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author bases the regulatory power of the Federal Government upon
the Commerce Clause in the Constitution. He then takes up with
fair detail the two outstanding regulatory measures, namely the
Acts of 1912 and 1927, showing how the power under the former
was broken down by the Zenith and Intercity Radio cases and the
subsequent opinion of the attorney-general, thus making the 1927
Act a necessity if Federal regulation was to continue. It is interesting to note that, in discussing the new act, Judge Davis gives
answer to recent claims that it is unconstitutional because an exercise
of the power to revoke licenses amounts to a taking of property
without due process, by the contention that the commission hearing
plus the opportunity of appeal to the courts, guaranteed under the
act, supplies the element of due process. There follows a treatment
of state jurisdiction over local problems, dependent upon the police
power, and a chapter dealing with rights of reception, wherein the
author applies the analogy to the law of nuisance, and the rights of
transmission, covering priorities between broadcasters. Copyrights,
control of programs, libel and slander via radio, and a short statement of the problems of international communication, complete the
volume.
Judge Davis was peculiarly well situated, by reason of his connection with the Department of Commerce during the rapid growth
of radio communication, to give us an intimate discussion of the
problems attendant upon that growth. He has sketched the picture.
If he is thought to have stopped short of a complete analysis of those
problems, perhaps he will repair the deficiency by a more comprehensive work in the future, written in the same excellent style.
FRANK S. ROWLEY.

University of Cincinnati,
College of Law.

